



**DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS
NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
27130 TELEGRAPH ROAD
QUANTICO VA 22134-2253**

5720 2025-004673
SER00LJF/25U0546
April 9, 2025

Ms. Emma North-Best
MuckRock News
411A Highland Avenue
Somerville, MA 02144

RE: FOIA Request NCIS 2025-NavyFOIA-004673

Dear Ms. North-Best:

This responds to your May 30, 2019 electronic Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request seeking information concerning "BUFILE 157-21356. Your request, along with declassified documentation, was electronically referred to us for processing by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and assigned tracking number: 2025-004673.

The processing of the referred documents is complete. Our review of these documents revealed they contained personal identifiers (such as names and social security numbers) of third parties, the release of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Accordingly, we have *partially* denied your request and withheld this information pursuant to the FOIA provisions 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) and (b)(7)(C). Our review also included consideration of the "foreseeable harm standard" (i.e., that information which might technically fall within an exemption should not be withheld from a FOIA requester unless the agency can identify a foreseeable harm or legal bar to disclosure).

All releasable information is contained within enclosure (1). We have also provided an enclosure explaining the various exemptions of the FOIA.

Under 32 CFR §701.12(a), you have a right to appeal our exemptions. Appeals may be submitted through the mail or electronically via e-mail. All appeals must be received within 90 calendar days from the date of this letter, contain the reasons for your appeal, and include a copy of this letter along with a copy of your original request.


1. You may appeal in writing to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy (Code 14), 1322 Patterson Avenue SE, Suite 3000, Washington Navy Yard, DC 20374-5066. Your letter must be postmarked (vice received) to the above office within the 90-day appeal limit. The letter of appeal and the envelope must both bear the notation: "FOIA Appeal."

2. Alternatively, you may appeal online via the public portal of the SecureRelease (the Department of the Navy's FOIA processing system). Go to <https://www.securerelease.us> and click "Login/Create Account" (in the top-right corner). You must have a SecureRelease account and have also submitted your request through SecureRelease in order to appeal. Once complete, you will be able to file your appeal by clicking the "Create Appeal" button in the top-right corner of your FOIA request page.
3. To appeal a request that was not submitted through the SecureRelease portal, go to <https://www.securerelease.us> and click "Login/Create Account" (in the top-right corner) and enter the required information to create an account. Next click the "Create Request" button on the SecureRelease portal homepage in order to create a new FOIA request (do not choose Privacy Act request). In the Request Description field, indicate that this is an appeal and make reference to the original FOIA tracking number you received to easily identify the request you wish to appeal.

If you choose not to appeal, you have the right to seek dispute resolution services. You may contact the Department of the Navy's FOIA public liaison, Mr. Chris Julka, at christopher.a.julka@navy.mil or (703) 697-0031 or the Office of Government Information Services (<https://ogis.archives.gov/>).

There are no assessable fees associated with the processing of your request. If you have any questions, please contact our office at (571)305-9092 or via email at ncis_foia@ncis.navy.mil.

Sincerely,



W. H. FERRELL, III
Counsel

Enclosure: 1. Documents

ENCLOSURE

(1)



Explanation of the Nine FOIA Exemptions

The following is a list of FOIA exemptions which apply to Government information in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 552(b):

(b)(1) EXEMPTION – Protects Classified Matters of National Defense or Foreign Policy.

This exemption protects from disclosure national security information concerning the national defense or foreign policy, provided that it has been properly classified in accordance with the substantive and procedural requirements of an executive order.

(b)(2) EXEMPTION – Internal Personnel Rules and Practices.

This exemption exempts from mandatory disclosure records “related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.” Courts have interpreted the exemption to encompass two distinct categories of information:

- (a) Internal matters of a relatively trivial nature – sometimes referred to as “low2” information: and

(b)(3) EXEMPTION – Information Specifically Exempted by Other Statutes:

This exemption incorporates the disclosure prohibitions that are contained in various other federal statutes. As originally enacted in 1966, Exemption 3 was broadly phrased so as to simply cover information “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.” The new Exemption 3 statute prohibits agencies from releasing under the FOIA proposals, “unless that proposal” is set forth or incorporated by reference in a contract entered into between the agency and the contractor that submitted the proposal.”

(b)(4) EXEMPTION – Trade Secrets Commercial or Financial Information.

This exemption protects “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person (this is) privileged or confidential.” This exemption is intended to protect the interest of both the government and submitter of information.

(b)(5) EXEMPTION – Privileged Interagency or Intra-Agency Memoranda or Letters.

This exemption protects “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums of letters which would not be available by law to a party... in litigation with the agency.” As such, it has been construed to “exempt those documents, and only those documents, normally privileged in the civil discovery context.”

(b)(6) EXEMPTION- Personal Information Affecting an Individual’s Privacy.

This exemption permits the government to withhold all information about individuals in “personnel and medical files and similar files” when the disclosure of such information “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” This exemption cannot be invoked to withhold from a requester information pertaining to the requester.

(b)(7) EXEMPTION – Investigatory Records Compiled for Law Enforcement Purposes.

As amended, this exemption protects from disclosure “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes.

EXEMPTION 7(A) Records of information that could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings. This exemption authorizes the withholding of “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that production of such law enforcement records or information... could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.”

EXEMPTION 7(B) Disclosure which would deprive a person of a fair trial or an impartial adjudication. Records that would prevent prejudicial pretrial publicity that could impair a proceeding, protect “records of information compiled for law enforcement purposes (the disclosure of which) would deprive a person of the right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication.”

EXEMPTION 7(C) Personal Information in Law Enforcement Records. This exemption provides protection for personal information in law enforcement records. This exemption is the law enforcement counterpart to Exemption 6, providing protection for law enforcement information the disclosure of which “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”

EXEMPTION 7(D) Identity of a Confidential Source. This exemption provides protection for “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes (which) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source – including a State, local or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis – and, in the case of a record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source.”

EXEMPTION 7(E) Circumvention of the Law. This exemption affords protection to all law enforcement information which “would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigation or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.”

EXEMPTION 7(F) Physical Safety to Protect a wide Range of individuals. This exemption permits the withholding of information necessary to protect the physical safety of a wide range of individuals. Whereas Exemption 7(F) previously protected records that “would... endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.” The amended exemption provides protection to “any individual when disclosure of information about him or her “could reasonably be expected to endanger (his/her) life or physical safety.”

(b)(8) EXEMPTION – Records of Financial Institutions.

This exemption covers matters that are “contained in or related to examinations, operating, or condition reported prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions.”

(b)(9) EXEMPTION – Geographical and Geophysical Information Concerning Wells.

This exemption covers “geological and geophysical information and data, including maps concerning wells.”

Index A

Unclassified documents which originated with your agency are being referred to you. Please correspond directly with the requester regarding these documents.

NIS INFORMATION REPORT		DATE 07-16-73	/NO3800/SER 0168
CODE 813	CONTROL 07-13-73N81-KI67-XXXX/N	STATUS CONFIDENTIAL	
DISTRIBUTION H.0022.M/C.8122.M/I.80HQ.M/I.81LW.M/I.0322.M//		COPY TO ((SEE END OF TEXT))	
MADE AT OKINAWA PREFECTURE JAPAN		MADE BY (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) REPRESENTATIVE	
REQUESTER		SUPPLEMENTAL DATE	
SEX	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	MILITARY SERVICE NO.	BIRTH (DATE) (GPC) (PLACE)

NI TITLE
I/VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR—OKINAWA/Weekly Indochina News Report, No. 5 (U)

REFERENCE

(A) NISRA OKINAWA NIR/06-29-73/SUBJ: VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR—OKINAWA/Weekly Indochina News Report, 29 June 1973, No. 4/CCN: 06-28-73N81-KI33-XXXX

DOI/JUL 73
DPA/07-13-73/OKINAWA
EVAL/C-3
SOURCE/72N81-0014

SUMMARY

1. (C) Attachment (1) is a copy of the Weekly Indochina News Report, 12 July 1973, No. 5, prepared recently at the PEOPLE'S HOUSE (PH), which serves as the headquarter for the National Lawyers Guild Military Law Office (NLGMO), Pacific Counseling Service (PCS), and Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) in Koza City, Okinawa Prefecture, Japan. Printed in the name of the VVAW, it consists of a reprint of an article from the 2 July 1973 issue of American Report titled "The Second Agreement on Viet Nam," by Richard POLLOCK. POLLOCK is described as a member of the staff of the "Indochina Resource Center, a Washington-based research group." Attachment (1) was prepared for distribution to military personnel on Okinawa.

NIS/NISO JAPAN FILES

2. (C) Reference (a) submitted a copy of the fourth issue of Weekly Indochina News Report dated 29 June 1973.

COMMENTS

3. (C) Mechanical problems with the PH mimeograph machine are believed responsible for a few days' delay in the publication of attachment (1). There does not appear thus far to be a military associate of the PH with the capability to write an original article for that publication.

ATTACHMENT

(1) Weekly...Report/07-12-73...(Copy all)

COPY TO:

COMUSJAPAN (J-2) DET R 500TH MIG
COMNAVFORJAPAN (N-2)
CGTHIRDMAIDIV (G-2)
CG MCB CAMP BUTLER (G-2)
CO MAG 36 (S-2)
LEGAT AMEMB TOKYO
AFOSI DO 43

CLASSIFIED BY: USNAVINSERVO JAPAN (KI)
SUBJ TO GDS OF EO 11652
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 1979

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

WARNING

CLASSIFICATION
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS 79

NIR PAGE
LAST

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
CONTENTS MAY BE DISCLOSED ONLY TO PERSONS WHOSE OFFICIAL DUTIES REQUIRE ACCESS HERETO. CONTENTS MAY NOT BE DISCLOSED TO THE PARTY(IES) CONCERNED WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION FROM THE NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE.



JULY 12, 1973

FROM YOU, ACCORDING TO DOD
DIRECTIVE 1325.6 POSSESSION OF
UNAUTHORIZED MATERIAL MAY NOT
BE PROHIBITED.

The Second Agreement on Viet Nam

by Richard Pollock

They met and they negotiated and when they were done a second agreement on Viet Nam had been written within five months of the first. The result, a 14-point joint communique signed by the four signatories to the original Paris Agreement on Viet Nam offering much of the same, but also much that was new.

The product at first seemed ordinary enough. The communique reaffirmed many of the political and military provisions of the earlier Paris Agreement; at times the language appeared quite similar, if not identical, to the wording of the original document of Jan. 27. A ho-hum attitude was promoted in Washington, as the joint communique received cool treatment by White House public relations experts.

Yet in Washington, and later in Paris, the first hints began to emerge, suggesting that the June 13 communique, represented something new and dramatically different.

The difference stood out most sharply in the separate press conferences held by both sides in the days following the formal signing. Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's foreign affairs adviser and chief negotiator in this latest round of talks on Viet Nam appeared to be somber, cautious, and restrained in his assessment of the results of the negotiations.

Jubilant

Le Duc Tho, Special Envoy of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (D.R.V.) and Provisional Revolutionary Government Minister of State, Prof. Nguyen Van Hieu, on the other hand, appeared jubilant and enthusiastic.

Tho, who met Kissinger in Paris in three arduous negotiating sessions, could hardly conceal his delight over the public acceptance by the United States and the Saigon Administration of the provisions of the 14-point communique.

Stepping before the large audience that had gathered at the International Conference Center in Paris on the day of the signing, he hailed the joint communique as

a "victory of the Vietnamese people" and predicted that if the United States and Saigon would scrupulously respect the declaration "then we think that a durable peace will be assured in Viet Nam."

In Viet Nam great importance has been attached to the joint declaration. It has been interpreted by many there to represent a major diplomatic victory for the D.R.V. and their allies, the Provisional Revolutionary Government in South Viet Nam, the National United Front in Cambodia, and the Pathet Lao in Laos.

For public consumption, Washington developed a vague line about the negotiations serving to "strengthen the peace" in Indochina. What Kissinger and Nixon had originally hoped to achieve with the sessions still remains to be fully answered, yet the preliminary meeting between U.S. Ambassador Sullivan and D.R.V. Vice Minister Thach went very badly as the United States adopted a hard and belligerent attitude toward the North Vietnamese.

Renewed Aggression

Thach accused the U.S. of using the meetings to serve as the justification for renewed military aggression against his country. Sullivan responded in kind by charging the North Vietnamese with various kinds of ceasefire violations.

Yet as the meetings in Paris continued, Washington's public stand began to soften markedly. The tough White House talk about possible "consequences" for North Vietnamese behavior and the daily Pentagon pronouncements about illegal North Vietnamese troop infiltration soon died away to be replaced by an unusual silence.

Knowledgeable observers agree that up through the late part of May, Washington had been pursuing a dual strategy of leaking charges of ceasefire violations by the other side to the U.S. press while selectively and systematically permitting violations to be undertaken by its own forces.

Washington's Viet Nam strategy was interpreted by many to mean that the Nixon Administration had abandoned the

"decent interval" theory in favor of preserving, at any cost, the Saigon regime of General Thieu. (The decent interval theory was a strategy discussed as an option, by which the U.S. could withdraw commitment to the Saigon regime over a period timed so that any compromise or collapse by the regime would not affect U.S. interests.)

Under this revised position, the Washington pledge of support to the Saigon regime as the "sole and legitimate government" of South Viet Nam was linked to a policy of threatening military retaliation if its plans for imposing the regime in the South were disrupted.

Yet by mid-May, it was ironically the domestic situation in the United States which forced a change in Washington's hard stand and which undoubtedly had some effect on the White House negotiating strategy with the D.R.V.

The Congressional fallout from the mushrooming Watergate scandal and Congressional votes on funding the U.S. bombing of Cambodia are believed to have contributed, at least in part, to Washington's change in heart from the position of last May. "I think the Congressional effort was beginning to have an overwhelming effect on the White House" said one Capitol Hill source intimately involved with the present antiwar legislation.

Important Meetings

For the Vietnamese, the Paris meetings were important because of the rising incidence of ceasefire violations by both the U.S. and Saigon. Saigon had implemented only a few of the key provisions of the Paris Agreement and was openly ignoring the rest. The Vietnamese were angered that Washington was taking the position of a disinterested third party while failing to live up to its own obligations under the Agreement.

The Vietnamese were also irritated by the pious attitude of the White House while the President summarily proceeded to suspend

economic talks, halt minesweeping operations, resume military flights over the D.R.V., and continue fierce bombing across the width and breadth of Cambodia.

The final document released on June 13 has startled those who have read it carefully, for while it addresses most of the complaints of the Vietnamese revolutionaries, it makes little or no mention of the accusations the U.S. and Saigon have publicly lodged against the D.R.V. and P.R.G. over the months.

For the Saigon regime it is a bitter disappointment. The Thieu regime had hoped that there would be some mention of a withdrawal timetable for the bulk of the 140,000 troops of the People's Liberation Armed Forces who have originated north of the 17th parallel.

It was also Saigon's desire to see the status of the Demilitarized Zone (D.M.Z.) upgraded so that it could serve to permanently divide North and South Viet Nam and repudiate the idea advanced in the original agreement that Viet Nam is but one country.

Saigon apparently failed on both counts. Not only was there no withdrawal timetable, but there was also no mention of the issue of the 140,000 troops.

And article 3, paragraph 7(b) of the communique reduced what little status was left to the D.M.Z. by explicitly sanctioning the transit of military equipment through the demarcation line.

Saigon's objection to the communique's order for local military commanders to meet within 40 hours of the signing was also rejected. Saigon fears that such low-level fraternization between the two armies will further demoralize its already faltering army morale.

The Thieu regime had hoped to avoid the entire issue of the estimated 200,000 political prisoners it holds, in keeping with

its public claim that there are no political prisoners. Under the communique's terms, the release of political prisoners is to be settled within 45 days. The original agreement was much vaguer on this score.

Thieu also fears that the National Council for National Reconciliation and Concord, provided for in the January agreement, will threaten his regime and fight for the democratic rights and liberties he has restricted. His efforts to downgrade the National Council and the provision ensuring democratic liberties failed.

In similar fashion, the Saigon military junta urged that an early date be set for elections without the guarantees of civil liberties. The P.R.G. responded that no genuine elections could be held until the

and social conditions of the people, a right Washington has been reluctant to dispute.

President Nixon failed to secure a political or military solution to Cambodia in the Paris discussions. The joint communique included only an oblique reference urging implementation of Article 20 of the Paris Agreement which deals with Cambodia and Laos. Tho underscored this point by later stating that "the destiny of Cambodia belongs to the Cambodian people."

It had also been Washington's hope that by delaying the mine removal operations and interrupting North Viet Nam's economic trade, the White House could exert pressure upon the North Vietnamese. A 30-day deadline has now been set for the completion of the minesweeping operations.

Flights Prohibited

The resumption of U.S. military flights over the D.R.V., in violation of the Paris Agreement has been indefinitely prohibited by the communique.

Refusing to be the victim of the carrot and stick mentality of the White House, the Vietnamese succeeded in resuming economic talks without conditions attached.

It is unclear whether this new communique will accomplish much beyond the Paris Agreement in its immediate application. Already Saigon has repudiated all but several articles in their official Ministry of Information publication, "The Paris Joint Communique of June Thirteenth: Analysis and Observations."

Saigon has announced the unilateral setting of a date for elections without the concurrence of either the P.R.G. or the independent Third Force.

And eyewitness accounts have already filed several reports of Saigon artillery and ground offensives, especially in the northern provinces and in the highland areas of South Viet Nam.

Yet beyond the daily headlines, the joint communique is a commentary on the emerging strength of the P.R.G. and the D.R.V. To the extent that the communique embraces their interpretation of the situation in Indochina—and not Washington's or Saigon's—it has been regarded generally as a diplomatic and political victory for the other side. "The recent negotiations" said Le Duc Tho, "achieved good results... (it) constitutes a victory of reason."

Saigon have publicly lodged against the D.R.V. and P.R.G. over the months.

For the Saigon regime it is a bitter disappointment. The Thieu regime had hoped that there would be some mention of a withdrawal timetable for the bulk of the 140,000 troops of the People's Liberation Armed Forces who have originated north of the 17th parallel.

It was also Saigon's desire to see the status of the Demilitarized Zone (D.M.Z.) upgraded so that it could serve to permanently divide North and South Viet Nam and repudiate the idea advanced in the original agreement that Viet Nam is but one country.

Saigon apparently failed on both counts. Not only was there no withdrawal timetable, but there was also no mention of the issue of the 140,000 troops.

And article 3, paragraph 7(b) of the communique reduced what little status was left to the D.M.Z. by explicitly sanctioning the transit of military equipment through the demarcation line.

Saigon's objection to the communique's order for local military commanders to meet within 48 hours of the signing was also rejected. Saigon fears that such low-level fraternization between the two armies will further demoralize its already faltering army morale.

The Thieu regime had hoped to avoid the entire issue of the estimated 200,000 political prisoners it holds, in keeping with

its public claim that there are no political prisoners. Under the communique's terms, the release of political prisoners is to be settled within 45 days. The original agreement was much vaguer on this score.

Thieu also fears that the National Council for National Reconciliation and Concord, provided for in the January agreement, will threaten his regime and fight for the democratic rights and liberties he has restricted. His efforts to downgrade the National Council and the provision ensuring democratic liberties failed.

In similar fashion, the Saigon military junta urged that an early date be set for elections without the guarantees of civil liberties. The P.R.G. responded that no genuine elections could be held until the fighting stops and liberties are restored. The communique sets no date for elections.

Washington's accusation alleging that the North Vietnamese were illegally transporting troops and equipment was omitted from the communique. On the other hand, Article 3(a) of the declaration reasserts the right of each party to bring in military support elements to provide for the population's welfare. Presumably this provision reaffirms the P.R.G. position that the transit along the Ho Chi Minh trail has been destined for improving the economic

point by later stating that the destiny of Cambodia belongs to the Cambodian people."

It had also been Washington's hope that by delaying the mine removal operations and interrupting North Viet Nam's economic trade, the White House could exert pressure upon the North Vietnamese. A 30-day deadline has now been set for the completion of the minesweeping operations.

Flights Prohibited

The resumption of U.S. military flights over the D.R.V., in violation of the Paris Agreement has been indefinitely prohibited by the communique.

Refusing to be the victim of the carrot and stick mentality of the White House, the Vietnamese succeeded in resuming economic talks without conditions attached.

It is unclear whether this new communique will accomplish much beyond the Paris Agreement in its immediate application. Already Saigon has repudiated all but several articles in their official Ministry of Information publication, "The Paris Joint Communique of June Thirteenth: Analysis and Observations."

Saigon has announced the unilateral setting of a date for elections without the concurrence of either the P.R.G. or the independent Third Force.

And eyewitness accounts have already filled several reports of Saigon artillery and ground offensives, especially in the northern provinces and in the highland areas of South Viet Nam.

Yet beyond the daily headlines, the joint communique is a commentary on the emerging strength of the P.R.G. and the D.R.V. To the extent that the communique embraces their interpretation of the situation in Indochina—and not Washington's or Saigon's—it has been regarded generally as a diplomatic and political victory for the other side. "The recent negotiations," said Le Duc Tho, "achieved good results. (It) constitutes a victory of reason."

Richard Pollock is on the staff of the Indochina Resource Center, a Washington-based research group.

AMERICAN REPORT

July 2, 1973

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

NIS INFORMATION REPORT		DATE 07-16-73	NO3800/SER 0176	
CODE 81KI	CC 07-15-73N81-KI75-XXXX/N	STATUS		
DISTRIBUTION H.0022.M/C.8122.M/I.80HQ.M/I.81IW.M//			COPY TO ((SEE END OF TEXT))	
MADE AT OKINAWA PREFECTURE JAPAN		MADE BY (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) REPRESENTATIVE		
REQUESTER		SUPPLEMENTAL DATE		
SEX	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	MILITARY SERVICE NO.	BIRTH	(DATE) (GPC) (PLACE)

NI TITLE
I/PEOPLE'S HOUSE--OKINAWA/Financial situation (U)

REFERENCES

- (A) NISRA OKINAWA NIR/06-19-73/SUBJ: PEOPLE'S HOUSE--OKINAWA/Personnel shifts/CCN: 06-16-73N81-KI26-XXXX
- (B) NISRA OKINAWA NIR/07-16-73/SUBJ: PEOPLE'S HOUSE--OKINAWA/Personnel shifts/CCN: 07-15-73N81-KI73-XXXX

DOI/JUL 73
DPA/07-15-73/OKINAWA
EVAL/C-3
SOURCE/72N81-0015

SUMMARY

1. (C) Report discusses current financial straits at the PEOPLE'S HOUSE (PH).

DETAILS

2. (C) Financial resources at the PEOPLE'S HOUSE (PH), which serves as the headquarters for the National Lawyers Guild (NLG) Military Law Office, Pacific Counseling Service (PCS), and Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) in Koza City, Okinawa Prefecture, Japan, have become quite low. The PH monthly check from the PCS in San Francisco is about two weeks overdue, although some funds have been received from the NLG in New York. PH activists recently discussed their belief that the movement on Okinawa will cease to exist within two years because of the inability of the PCS to provide regular and adequate funding. They are talking of collecting dues from military regulars and printing small fliers which explain their activities and appeal for contributions. Another measure under consideration is to ask military personnel seeking legal services to contribute ten per cent of their pay checks.

3. (C) A present source of revenue is in the form of contributions by military visitors. An Army enlisted man known as (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recently volunteered \$20.00 and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) voluntarily gave \$10.00. Additionally, an unidentified Marine solicited roughly \$20.00 from other Marines in his barracks and turned it over to the PH. Activists working in Kin-son (adjacent to Camp Hansen), Okinawa Prefecture, say they can collect as much as \$25.00 while distributing literature to military personnel in that area.

4. (C) Unless their finances improve soon, PH activists are thinking of vacating their living spaces in Kin-son and commuting daily between the PH and the UNITED

CLASSIFIED BY: USNAVINVSERVO JAPAN (KI) 157-11356-
SUBJ TO GDS OF EO 11652
ENCLOSURE

DECLASSIFIED ON: 31 DEC 79

CONFIDENTIAL

GDS 79

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
CONTENTS MAY BE DISCLOSED ONLY TO PERSONS WHOSE OFFICIAL DUTIES REQUIRE

CONFIDENTIAL

WARNING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WARNING NOTICE-
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

NIS INFORMATION REPORT		DATE	07-16-73		/N03800/SER C176	
CODE	CONT	STATUS				
81KI	07-15-73N81-KI75-XXXX					
DISTRIBUTION				COPY TO		
MADE AT			MADE BY			
REQUESTER			SUPPLEMENTAL DATE			
SEX	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	MILITARY SERVICE NO.	BIRTH	(DATE)	(GPC)	(PLACE)

NI TITLE

I/PEOPLE'S HOUSE—OKINAWA/Financial situation (U)

FRONT (UP).

5. (C) NLG activists (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) plan to go on a speaking tour following their return to the U. S. in August 1973 in an effort to raise funds for the movement. The PH expects to benefit from those efforts. PH activist (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (DPOB: Unavailable) has been in touch with her counterparts in the women's movement in the U. S. They have asked for pictures of movement activities on Okinawa for use in their own fund-raising drive in support of the Okinawa movement. She also has talked of communicating with four members of the "Yippies," including a person known as (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) who she is sure can raise money for the PH.

NIS/NISO JAPAN FILES

6. (C) References (a) and (b) suggested possible financial problems at the PH.

COMMENTS

7. (C) The anti-military movement on Okinawa is believed to have suffered from financial straits in the past, but its present situation is thought to be the most extreme yet experienced among local activists. Their pessimistic view of the future of the movement on Okinawa and the difficulties they seem to be having in transporting new activists from the U. S., as indicated by referenced reports, are worthy of note. The situation described in the above report could be altered significantly in the event new funds are received by the PH from unexpected sources.

COPY TO:

COMUSJAPAN (J-2)
CCNAVFORJAPAN (N-2)
CGTHIRDMARDIV (G-2)
CG MCB CAMP BUTLER (G-2)
LEGAT AMEMB TOKYO
AFOSI DO 43
DET R 500TH MIG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WARNING

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

WARNING NOTICE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

NIS INFORMATION REPORT		DATE	07-16-73		/N03800/SER. C174	
CODE	ROL	STATUS	CONFIDENTIAL			
81KI	07-15-73N81-KI73-XXXX/N					
DISTRIBUTION H.0022.M/C.8122.M/I.80HQ.M/I.8222.M/I.81IW.M//					COPY TO ((SEE END OF TEXT))	
MADE AT OKINAWA PREFECTURE JAPAN			MADE BY (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) REPRESENTATIVE			
REQUESTER			SUPPLEMENTAL DATE			
SEX	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	MILITARY SERVICE NO.	BIRTH	(DATE)	(GPC)	(PLACE)

NI TITLE

I/PEOPLE'S HOUSE--OKINAWA/Personnel shifts (U)

REFERENCES

- (A) NISRA OKINAWA NIR/07-16-73/SUBJ: PEOPLE'S HOUSE--OKINAWA/Interest in developments in the Marianas Islands/CCN: 07-15-73N81-KI72-XXXX
- (B) NISRA OKINAWA NIR/07-06-73/SUBJ: PEOPLE'S HOUSE--OKINAWA/Personnel shifts/CCN: 07-02-73N81-KI40-XXXX

DOI/JUL 73

DPA/07-15-73/OKINAWA

EVAL/C-3

SOURCE/72N81-0014

SUMMARY

1. (C) Report discusses projected personnel shifts at the PEOPLE'S HOUSE (PH).

DETAILS

2. (C) The latest indications at the PEOPLE'S HOUSE (PH), which serves as the headquarters for the National Lawyers Guild Military Law Office (NLGMO), Pacific Counseling Service (PCS), and Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) in Koza City, Okinawa Prefecture, Japan, are that the following moves of PH activists will occur within the next few months:

a. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) may leave in about mid-August 1973. He hopes to travel through Cambodia and talk to some friends there in the hope of encouraging the organization of an anti-war, anti-military movement there. He also would like to stop off in the Marianas Islands [cf. reference (a)].

b. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is expected to leave for the U. S. prior to 20 August 1973, when her visa reportedly expires.

c. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also is expected to leave for the U. S. prior to 20 August 1973, when his visa reportedly expires.

d. The activist expected from the U. S. has not been heard from for some time [cf. reference (b)]. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reportedly learned of the reason for his planned trip to Okinawa and raised some objections to his plans to become involved in the movement. Movement activists in the U. S. succeeded in getting him out of his home state and as far as Colorado, but he has not been heard from since.

CLASSIFIED BY: USNAVINSERVO JAPAN (KI)
SUBJ TO GDS OF EO 11652 157-21356-
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 1979

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFIED
EXCLUDED~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS 79

WARNING

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WARNING NOTICE-
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

NIS INFORMATION REPORT		DATE 07-16-73	/N03800/SER C174	
CODE 81KI	CONTROL 07-15-73N81-KI73-XXXX/N	SIGNATURE		
DISTRIBUTION		COPY TO CONFIDENTIAL		
MADE AT		MADE BY		
REQUESTER		SUPPLEMENTAL DATE		
SEX	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	MILITARY SERVICE NO.	BIRTH	(DATE) (GPC) (PLACE)

NI TITLE
I/PEOPLE'S HOUSE--OKINAWA/Personnel shifts (U)

e. Two couples may arrive on Okinawa to replace (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) by the end of August 1973.

f. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) must leave Okinawa by 20 November 1973. She has indicated a willingness to remain beyond that date if the PCS will pay the cost of her plane fare back to the U. S.

g. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) plans leave in about mid-November 1973 but has not decided on a date.

h. There are indications that the counseling center in Yokosuka, Japan, may be without a regular civilian activist. If that situation occurs, the PH may send someone from the UNITED FRONT (UF), possibly one of the new couples expected in August. They feel that Yokosuka should be staffed by a lawyer as well as a movement person because they view that location as important.

i. Nothing further has been heard concerning the black activist the PH has been expecting during recent months.

NIS/NISO JAPAN FILES

3. (C) Reference (a) reported PH interest in the Marianas Islands. Reference (b) reported previous developments regarding personnel shifts at the PH.

COMMENTS

4. (C) Funding, organizational problems, and apparent dwindling interest in the anti-military movement as it has been known seem to be contributing to current staffing problems at the PH and its auxiliaries. The arrival of an entirely new staff, if it occurs, likely will bring about shifts in emphasis and activities in the Okinawa movement.

COPY TO:
COMUSJAPAN (J-2)
COMNAVFORJAPAN (N-2)
CGTHIRDMAF (G-2)
CG MCB CAMP S D BUTLER (G-2)
LEGAT AFEMB TOKYO
AFOSI DO 43
DET R 500TH MIG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WARNING
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE